An ‘impasse’ on face-to-face contact between mother and daughter
COP 13258625, before Mr Justice Poole, on 19 June 2023
Precis of an Open Justice Court of Protection Project account of the hearing by Celia Katzinger
This was a remote hearing in the Court of Protection about FP, a woman deprived of her liberty in a residential nursing home who experienced cerebral palsy, mobility difficulties and ‘treatment-resistant paranoid schizophrenia’.
FP lacked capacity to conduct proceedings and to make decisions about her residence, care and support, and contact with others. A previous judgement found that FP’s mother (FPM) had an “enmeshed” relationship with FP which exposed her to “high expressed emotion” and deteriorations in her mental health. Also, that FPM had sought to control, challenge and interfere with FPs treatment and medication. A series of prior orders had prevented FPM from having face-to-face contact with FP and set out rules of conduct for supervised video or telephone contacts. Additionally, a frequently breached injunction prohibited FPM from placing video recordings of FP in the public domain which FPM said showed FPs distress and her deplorable care. The hearing was to determine whether the suspension of face-to-face contact should remain in place.
The position of the applicant Local Authority was that despite FPs wishes, it was not in her best interests to have face-to-face contact with FPM which may reduce her autonomy, and impede her article 8 rights to a private life, but that if contact were reinstated, it should be an incremental process, initially providing for 30 minute visits every four weeks. Also, that it be conditional upon FPM having no electronic devices with her to prevent recording and that existing restrictions – such as avoiding discussions with FP around medication, complaints against social workers or to agencies such as the Police – should be continued. Further, that arrangements should be kept under review and returned to court if necessary. However, recognising this as a finely balanced judgement based in large part on the conduct of FPs mother, the local authority stated that if the Judge had reached a provisional view on the papers, they would be inclined to accept it.
FPM stated the current medication regime was causing FP suffering; refuted the treatment resistant nature of FPs condition; said a previous medication had been effective; that failing to provide it again equated to medical negligence and that the ‘permanent’ assessment that FP lacked capacity was incorrect. Also, that she intended to charge the court and everyone involved in FPs care with ‘psychopsema’ described as “an orchestrated assault, utilising several methods of fraud, psychological operations, psychological intimidation and other similar premeditated offence-based systems, against a parent, a child or a family… often committed by a malicious social worker…” When asked, FPM agreed she had previously referred to the matter as “torture” before directing Poole J to “study the case” and stating she would not see FP until her medication was altered. When Poole J sought to address these matters FPM frequently interrupted the judge, challenged his statements and asserted he was interrupting her until the Judge directed FPM to “be quiet for thirty seconds” noting he did not want FPM to say she would not see FP “without considering it carefully”.
Following a thirty minute pause for a conversation with her McKenzie friend (MF), FPM was invited to provide evidence of any change to FPs capacity. She referenced her solicitor’s statement, FPs own wishes, a lack of trust of social services, the lack of protection afforded to FP by the court over the 5 year long proceedings which she called “a bullying exercise by the local authority through the social workers”; all of which the judge noted as having already been considered and unsuccessfully appealed. FPM was again asked if she was only willing to engage in face-to-face contact with FP if her medication was changed. FPM said she would love to see FP; that her medication must be revised by the court; that she would accept video calls for now; that the court was acting as a dictator and interfering with article 8 rights and rebutted the judges suggestions that she was putting obstacles in the way of seeing FP. When the judge asked FPM to be quiet, advising that he had to base his decision on the fact FPM had said she would refuse to see FP unless certain conditions were met, FPM stated the judge was interrupting her, torturing FP and asked to leave.
The KC acting for FP via her litigation friend (LitF) noted the LitF’s strong support of a trial of face-to-face contact between FP and FPM but believed a “robust plan” would be required to manage the “risks” but that given FPMs position, such contact would not now seem possible. The Lit F noted it was not in FPs best interests to prepare her for face-to-face contact with FPM if that was not going to be taken up and that unless FPM’s position altered the proceedings were rendered pointless.
The Judge sought to clarify FPM’s position again, this time establishing that she did wish to see FP but not in a distressed state. FPM then asked for FP’s medication list, asserted there was criminal activity going on and asked the judge to order an investigation. In response to the judges concerns as to her own mental health, FPM stated “There have never been any issues with my mental health, but you or this Family Court, is driving healthy parents into mental problems.” The judge then explained that “by saying that you refuse to see your daughter unless there are changes in medication, you will never see your daughter face-to-face, because there won’t be changes.”
FP’s Stepfather (FPS) stated FPM was not requesting a medication change but that the medication needed to be independently reviewed. The Judge reminded that FP’s medication was regularly reviewed and that he had previously ordered regular updating communications. FPS stated “we want to see FP. We do not want to be overmanaged. We do not want to be blamed for causing FP distress… We need a bit of breathing space. Please, arrange for… An unsupervised proper family meeting.”
The judge responded that: such meetings had caused FP distress; that FPM’s views fed into FP’s paranoia; that he could not direct that face-to-face contact be allowed if FPM was refusing that until certain conditions were met and that as such “we have an impasse because Mrs M is refusing to participate in face-to-face contact unless there are significant changes on her demand, and I have to proceed on that basis.
The MF then requested an audience with the Judge who instead rose to permit the MF to speak with counsel. During that conversation the MF made clear that FPM & FPS were not seeking an order for a change of medication but wanted regular medication reviews. When relaying the conversation to the Judge, the KC characterised it as “helpful” while pointing out that medication reviews were already conducted by the Mental Health Trust, who were not party to these proceedings. Examination of meeting minutes in the court bundle showed a community mental health team review had been conducted but no minutes had been provided to FPM but that doing so going forwards would be helpful.
In deciphering how to proceed, the Local Authority suggested an increase in video contact and that rather than asking for a final order, a further hearing be held in six months time (December 2023)when, if there were no movement in FPM’s position that the hearing be treated as a final hearing. The judge commented that “but for Mrs M’s position, I would have been minded to introduce face-to-face contact on a stepped basis… [which] is not possible at present because Mrs M has placed a condition on it that the court does not consider to be in FP’s best interests”.
The LitF asked the judge to revsit what FPM was actually asking for. The KC stated there was nothing against saying “we all thought it was in FP’s best interests to trial face-to-face meetings with her mother, but they’re not taking place because of the unreasonable position taken by her mother. If she changed her mind, contact could be arranged without a return to court, but with a December hearing listed as a backstop. FPM reiterated her prior points around medication, capacity and told the judge to “Please study the law” and said, “See you in another court!” and that “This court has a duty of care, a duty of accountability. You have to answer for all these crimes hidden in secrecy. I will not be silent. It is not right that my daughter is suffering under dodgy treatment.”
In making his judgement Poole J reiterated the previous determinations around FPs lack of capacity and the lack of evidence to suggest any change (such as to medications) may alter that. Also that FP’s ‘chronic paranoid schizophrenia’ had led her to violent outbursts and beliefs that robots were attacking her and that others, able to see through her skin, were coming for her. However, she had settled well at the placement and was improved from her prior presentation when at home with FPM who the judge said did not believe FP had an underlying mental health condition but believed there was an underlying conspiracy to cause FP harm referred to as ‘psychopsema’.
The judge noted his view would have been that face-to-face contact was in FP’s best interests but FPMs refusal to engage in that absent a medication change meant “that face-to-face contact, sadly – and it is sadly – cannot take place.” But, that it was no longer the view of the court that such contact would not be in FP’s best interests such that if FP altered her position, contact could be reintroduced on the existing conditions without a return to Court. Nevertheless, Judge Poole adopted the backstop position of ordering a further hearing in six months time and that in the interim, remote contact be increased to once a week and that the injunctions preventing FPM from making or posting recordings of her daughter, or staff, and from publicising the proceedings would remain in place.
Finally Poole J addressed the conduct, disruption, interruption and discourtesy within the proceedings stating that “I have accepted [these behaviours] in order to… get to a conclusion in FP’s best interests …I am far from accepting that this is acceptable. I don’t know the reason for [FP’s] behaviour… She has behaved in a similar way at all previous hearings… [which] makes it difficult for everyone to focus on FP’s best interests, but I am satisfied that this has been done.”